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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
a. Nature of the Case. 
This is the Respondent's brief filed by the Idaho Department of Transportation 
(hereinafter "IDOT"). This is in response to an appeal filed by Michael Sherman Mecham 
(hereinafter "Mr. Mecham") in which the District Court upheld the suspension of his driver's 
license. 
b. Factual Statement and Procedural History. 
Mr. Mecham was arrested for DUI by Deputy Austin Flegel on the evening of June 1. 
2010. R, pp. 47-48. Deputy observed a vehicle on the side of the road with its lights on. 
Id. Deputy Flegel observed behavior which led him to believe Mr. Mecham was under the 
influence of alcohol. Id Mr. Mecham failed several field sobriety tests. ld. Mr. Mecham was 
then taken to the police station, where he failed the breath test. R, pp. 42, 4 60. The 
intoxilyzer printout shows Deputy Wren indicated he first observed Mr. Mecham at 0029. R, p. 
42. The two samples were taken at 1 :05 and 1 :06. Id. 
Mr. Mecham requested a suspension hearing at which the hearing officer upheld the 
suspension. R, pp. 75-82. Mr. Mecham filed an appeal with the District Court arguing that 
Deputy Flegel did not establish physical control by Mr. Mecham and the evidentiary test was not 
conducted in compliance with the proper procedures. R, pp. 125-128. 
The District Judge upheld the hearing officer's decision. R, p. 5. Mr. Mecham filed a 
timely Notice of Appeal on. R, p.150. 
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II. ISSUES ON APPEAL 
Did the district court correctly decide there was substantial evidence in the record to 
determine Mr. Mecham did not meet his burden of proof on the issues of actual physical control 
and the 15 minute wait period? 
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The Idaho Court of Appeals has set forth the standard of review when reviewing a case 
from the District Court. 
The Idaho Administrative Procedures Act (IDAPA) governs the review of department 
decisions to deny, cancel, suspend, disqualify, revoke, or restrict a person's driver's 
license. See J.C.§§ 49-201, 49-330, 67-5201 (2), 67-5270. In an appeal from the decision 
of the district court acting in its appellate capacity under IDAPA, this Court reviews the 
agency record independently of the district court's decision. Marshall v. Idaho Dep 1t of 
Transp., 137 Idaho 337,340, 48 P.3d 666,669 (Ct. App. 2002). This Court does not 
substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence presented. 
JC§ 67-5279(1); Marshall, 137 Idaho at 340, 48 P.3d at 669. This Court instead defers 
to the agency's findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous. Castaneda v. Brighton 
Corp., 130 Idaho 923,926,950 P.2d 1262, 1265 (1998); Marshall, 137 ldaho at 340, 48 
P.3d at 669. In other words, the agency's factual determinations are binding on the 
reviewing court, even where there is conflicting evidence before the agency, so long as 
the determinations are supported by substantial competent evidence in the record. Urrutia 
v. Blaine County, ex rel. Bd cfComm's, 134 Idaho 353, 357, 2 P.3d 738, 742 (2000); 
Marshall, 137 Idaho at 340, 48 P.3d at 669. 
A court may overturn an agency's decision where its findings, inferences, 
conclusions, or decisions: (a) violate statutory or constitutional provisions; (b) exceed the 
agency's statutory authority; (c) are made upon unlawful procedure; (d) are not supported 
by substantial evidence in the record; or ( e) are arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of 
discretion. LC§ 67-5279(3). The party challenging the agency decision must 
demonstrate that the agency erred in a manner specified in I.C. § 67-5279(3) and that a 
substantial right of that party has been prejudiced. Price v. PayetteCountyBd. of 
CountyComm'rs, 131 Idaho 426,429, 958 P.2d 583, 586 (1998); Marshall, 137 ldaho at 
340, 48 P.3d at 669. If the agency's decision is not affirmed on appeal, "it shall be set 
aside ... and remanded for further proceedings as necessary." JC§ 67-5279(3). 
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Archerv. State, Dep'tofTransp., 145 Idaho 617,181 P.3d 543,545 (Ct.App. 2008). 
IV. ARGUMENT 
1. Deputy Flegel established Mr. Mecham was in actual physical control of the vehicle. 
Deputy Flegel's affidavit states he established Mr. Mecham was in actual physical 
control of the vehicle. R, p. 43. Deputy Flegel's affidavit is not contradictory to his narrative as 
an individual can be sitting on the side of the road with the lights on and be in actual physical 
control of the vehicle. The fact the officer did not also include in his narrative report the vehicle 
was running did not preclude the hearing officer from determining the Mr. Mecham was in actual 
physical control based upon the record as a whole. R, p. 78. This conclusion was also 
reasonable in the light of the fact that Mr. Mecham did not contradict or offer any evidence to 
establish he was not in actual physical control of the vehicle. The burden is on Mr. Mecham as 
pointed out in Kane v. State, Dept. ofTransp., 139 Idaho 586, 83 P.3d 130 (Ct.App. 2003), 
where the Court of Appeal stated: 
Kane's second contention is that because of their nonconformity with certain 
requirements of the statutes and regulations, the documents sent by Officer Erickson did 
not prove legal cause to stop his car or prove that the blood alcohol test was properly 
administered. This argument misperceives the burden of proof at the hearing. It was not 
the ITD's burden at the administrative hearing to prove legal cause for the stop, to prove 
the reliability of the blood alcohol tests, or to disprove any of the possible grounds for 
challenging a suspension under § 18-8002A(7). To the contrary, the statute directs that 
"[t]he burden of proof shall be on the person requesting the hearing." J.C.§ 18-8002A(7). 
Thus, it was Kane's burden to present evidence affirmatively showing one or more of the 
grounds for relief enumerated in § 18-8002A(7). That is, it was his burden to prove that, 
infact, the officer lacked legal cause to stop Kane's vehicle or that the blood test was, in 
fact, not conducted in accordance with legal requirements. This burden is not met by 
merely showing that documents in the hands of the ITD are inadequate or inadmissible to 
reveal whether legal cause existed or whether the blood test was conducted properly. 
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Kane presented no evidence to meet his burden; his challenge to the suspension consisted 
solely of a technical attack upon the adequacy of the ITD's documentation. Because Kane 
made no prima facie showing, the ITD had no burden to present any evidence at all to the 
hearing officer. 
Perhaps flaws in documents submitted to the ITD could render them inadmissible or 
inadequate to rebut a petitioner's prima facie proof of one of the five statutory grounds to 
vacate a suspension, but that is a question that we need not decide today because Kane 
failed entirely to meet his initial burden to go forward with evidence proving some basis 
for relief. 
Kane, 139 Idaho at 590, 83 P.3d at 134. 
Mr. :vfecham did not present any evidence at the hearing to contradict the affidavit of 
Deputy Flegel. Just as the Kane Court found the Petitioner had tried to rely solely on 
inadequacies in the documents and did not present a prirna facie proof of one of the ground for 
relief, this Court should hold that Mr. Mecham is trying to solely rely on inadequacies in the 
documents (failure to include in the narrative portion of the report the fact the car was running or 
moving) and failed to present prima facie proof he was not in actual physical control of his 
vehicle. Mr. Mecham has not satisfied his burden. The hearing officer's determination that 
Deputy Flegel's statement in which he established actual physical control is based upon 
substantial and competent evidence in the record. This decision should be upheld. 
2. The hearing officer's determination the evidentiary test was performed in compliance 
with all requirements of law is supported by substantial evidence on the record as a 
whole. 
Deputy Flegel states in his report the following: 
When we to the jail I had the jail staff administer the breath test. While the 
notice of suspension tape was playing, Michael fell off his seat onto the floor and started 
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crying. We asked if he was ok and he said he was and to leave him alone. Michael asked 
if we were forcing him to take the breath test and we told him that the breath test was 
totally his choice but if he did not take it, we would have to go have a blood draw. 
R, p. 48. 
Deputy Wren was present during the testing and indicates in his report the following: 
On the above date [June 2, 2010] at approximately 0100 hours I Deputy Wren 
was asked by Deputy Flegel to administer the breathalyzer 5000 to Michael S. Mecham 
( dob . I played the notice of suspension form to Mr. Mecham and waited the 
15 minutes prior to offering him the test. While the form was being played Mechem fell 
off his chair and onto the ground and began to cry. We helped him back to his chair and 
he listened to the rest of the tape. Once the tape was finished I asked him if he was going 
to take the test. Mecham asked if we were forcing him to take it. I told him it was his 
choice but that if he declined to take it Deputy Flegel was going to take him to BMH to 
have blood draw. 
R, p. 60. 
Deputy Flegel's report indicates when he got to the jail he had the jail staff perform the 
breath test. Deputy Wren noted on the intoxilyzer report he made his first observation at 0029. 
Deputy Wren noted in his report that he waited the required 15 minute wait period. Deputy 
Wren began observations 36 minutes before the first valid breath sample was taken. This time 
period is over the required 15 minute observation time period required by law, which was 
extended due to Petitioner falling over and asking questions. 
Deputy Wren's statement that he was asked at approximately 0100 hours to perform the 
test should not be interpreted to mean he was not involved at all until O 100 or that he started the 
15 minute wait period at 0100. This is not supported by the facts in evidence. Both reports must 
be read together to determine what happened before the samples were actually taken. Both of 
the reports indicated while the suspension tape was playing Mr. Mecham fell out of his chair 
onto the ground and began crying. Both of the reports indicate they helped Mr. Mecham back 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 5 
into his chair. Both reports indicate it was Mr. Mecham's choice, but if he did not take the test 
they would obtain a blood draw. All of these events could not reasonably have occurred between 
0100 and 0 104 when the first invalid sample was taken. 
A more reasonable interpretation of both reports shows there was a 36 minute 
observation period during which the deputies played the suspension tape, helped Mr. Mecham 
back into his chair, answered his question, and obtained samples. Mr. Mecham has the burden to 
establish error and offered no testimony to rebut the fact Deputy Wren indicated he had followed 
the 15 minute wait period. Mr. Mecham may not rest on inadequacies in the documents, but 
must present prima facie proof the 15-minute wait period was not complied with. See Kane, 139 
Idaho at 590, 83 P.3d at 134. Mr. Mecham sought to present the testimony of Mr. Robert LaPeir, 
to testify the 15 minute wait period was not complied with. R, p. 76. Mr. Mecham did not 
testify or present any evidence to show the 15-minute wait period was not complied with, 
therefore he has not met his burden to dispute Depute Wren's statement that he played the notice 
of suspension and waited the required 15 minutes prior to offering the test. R, p. 60. 
Deputy Wren's use of the work approximately did not preclude the hearing officer from 
upholding the suspension based upon all of the evidence. The hearing officer's decision was 
suppo1ied by substantial evidence on the record as a whole and should be sustained. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Deputy Flegel's affidavit indicates Mr. Mecham was in actual physical control of the 
vehicle, which was not disputed with any contrary evidence by Mr. Mecham at the hearing. The 
most reasonable interpretation of the facts from both of the deputies' reports show the required 
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15 minute time period was followed before giving the breath test. Therefore, the decision of the 
District Court sustained the hearing officer's suspension of Mr. Mecham' s license should be 
sustained. 
;fl--
DA TED this _(o_.,,,, day of September, 2011. 
~/Z7~~ 
Alan R. Harrison 
Special Deputy Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
;( 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have on this b-day of September, 2011, caused two (2) 
true and correct copies of the attached RESPONDENT'S BRIEF by personal delivery, to the 
following pa1iies: 
Larrcn K. Covert 
SWAFFORD LAW OFFICE, CHARTERED 
Ninth Street 
Idaho Falls, ID 83404 
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